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Neuropragmatism: A
Neurophilosophical Manifesto
Tibor Solymosi and John Shook
The question of the integration of mind-body in
action is the most practical of all questions we can
ask of our civilization. It is not just a speculative
question; it is a demand: a demand that the labor
of multitudes now too predominantly physical in
character be inspirited by purpose and emotion
and informed by knowledge and understanding. It
is a demand that what now pass for highly
intellectual and spiritual functions shall be
integrated with the ultimate conditions and means
of all achievement, namely the physical, and
thereby accomplish something beyond themselves.
Until this integration is effected in the only place
where it can be carried out, in action itself, we
shall continue to live in a society in which a
soulless and heartless materialism is compensated
for by soulful but futile and unnatural idealism and
spiritualism.
John Dewey (1927/LW3: 29-30)
1 Neurophilosophical  pragmatism,  or  neuropragmatism,  is  a  scientifically  informed
treatment of cognition, knowledge, the body-mind relation, agency, socialization, and
further issues about these basic matters. Neuropragmatism is capable of grappling with
philosophical questions arising at many levels, from synapse to society. There is much at
stake,  as  the  opening  Dewey  quotation  claims.  With  its  firm  grounding  in  science,
neuropragmatism may be the best equipped philosophy for dealing productively with the
challenges fac- ing our culture, as developments in neuroscience and neurotechnology
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bring about both better means for dealing with problems,  old and new, and ways of
creating new problems, today and tomorrow.
2 The amazing progress  of  the behavioral  and brain sciences  have confirmed many of
pragmatism’s core claims, culminating in a resurgence of neopragmatism and then its
fresh flowering in neuropragmatism. The recovery of the concept of dynamic embodied
and embedded cognition and the renewed appreciation for the brain’s systems as evolved
functions  have  together  carried  many  researchers  towards  the  tenets  of
neuropragmatism. Scholars bold enough to draw conclusions about the nature of mind,
the dynamic nature of human knowledge, and the practical criteria for judging epistemic
success  unite  the  cognitive  strands  of  neuropragmatism.  Searching  for  such  a
comprehensive reunion of science and philosophy should not be disdained. In the words
of the editors of a recent book on embodied cognitive science,
We  need  to  put  together  conceptual  analyses  of  the  notions  of  representation,
computation,  emergence,  embodiment,  and  the  like,  with  empirical  work  that
allows us to bring together ecological, dynamic, interactive, situated, and embodied
approaches to the scientific study of cognition. (Calvo and Gomila 2008: 15)
3 Neuropragmatism offers  a  philosophical  intersection  for  coordinating  this  pluralistic
effort. The prefix ‘neuro’ does not portend a reductionistic agenda is intended by the
term  neuropragmatism.  Quite  the  opposite:  the  anti-reductionistic,  pluralistic,  and
interdisciplinary  tradition  of  pragmatism  remains  securely  at  the  heart  of
neuropragmatism. All the same, a philosophical position on cognition and mind must
cohere with the best neuroscience available.
4 We begin with a brief history of pragmatism and the sciences of life and mind. From this
history, we update pragmatism in this neurophilosophical form by introducing twelve
theses  of  neuropragmatism.  These  theses  emphasize  the  connections  between
pragmatism  and  the  sciences  of  life  and  mind,  and  propose  research  programs  for
engaging scientific researchers as well as for navigating the consequences of research for
the larger public.
 
Classical Pragmatism and Neuropragmatism
5 Pragmatism  has  from  its  origins  formulated  philosophical  theories  about  culture,
intelligence, and knowledge in ways that respect biology, anthropology, and cognitive
science.  Classical  pragmatism  was  the  original  American  cognitive  science  and
neurophilosophy. Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead
were  all  experimental  psychologists  who  tried  to  reform  philosophy  in  light  of
evolutionary biology, experimental psychology, and brain science. Indeed, most of the
early  American  psychologists  and  sociologists  had  strong  pragmatist  leanings.
Pragmatism is  vitally  interested  in  entirely  naturalistic  accounts  of  intelligence  and
agency, so that all other fields of philosophy from epistemology to ethics can be reformed
in  turn.  By  integrating  science  and  philosophy  together,  pragmatism  prevents  both
scientism and speculation from inflating debilitating dualisms.
6 Pragmatism has always viewed itself as essential to a complete and consistent naturalistic
worldview. Any naturalism has to explain how rationality, intelligence, and science are
possible within the natural world. Pragmatism has serious opponents not interested in
advancing naturalism. At the turn of the 20th century, major philosophical options were
few: common sense empiricisms; neo-Kantian rationalisms; phenomenologies; and neo-
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Hegelian idealisms. Common sense empiricism sought pure sensory impressions or sense
data:  ideas  that  carry  information  about  nature  untainted  by  any  thought,  so  that
cognition  simply  combines  and  rearranges that  original  information  into  knowledge
systems. Neoantian rationalisms, noticing empiricism’s deep problems, postulated non-
empirical  rational  principles  to  account  for  scientific  knowledge.  However,  such
rationalism  fed  into  anti-naturalism  and  dualism,  as  did  the  phenomenologies  that
prioritized qualitative experience over nature or biology.  Reconciling empiricism and
rationalism by adding historicism, neo-Hegelian cultural psychologies stumbled onto the
way that knowledge gradually grows from the interfusion of evidence and reasoning in
social contexts. John Dewey and George Herbert Mead further naturalized this cultural
historicism by incorporating Darwinian evolution and experimental  psychology (Cook
1993,  Popp  2007).  They  proposed  a  pragmatic  naturalism  in  opposition  to  naïve
empiricism,  static  representationalism,  reductive  materialism,  methodological
individualism,  and  animal  behaviorism.  To  accomplish  this  pragmatic  naturalism,
pragmatists  explored  metaphysical  issues  such  as  radical  empiricism  and  direct
perception, teleological accounts of living systems, non-reductive emergent naturalisms,
and  perspectival  and  process  ontologies.  Not  surprisingly,  neurophilosophers  and
especially neuropragmatists have been gradually rengaging these wider issues.
7 Pragmatism went into eclipse in philosophy departments by the 1930s due to analytic and
linguistic philosophy along with imports from European positivism. Yet pragmatic ideas
continued to flourish in the social sciences from psychology and linguistics to sociology
and anthropology. The neopragmatism of the 1970s and 80s, especially in the hands of
Richard Rorty, was well known for its linguistic and epistemic conventionalism, but not
for its congruence with the latest brain science. Hilary Putnam’s meaning externalism
and  pragmatic  realism  (Putnam  1999)  also  helped  to  make  actual  human  cognition
relevant to philosophical debates. Some philosophers inspired by W. V. Quine’s kind of
naturalism (which sustained the Deweyan point that cognitions and knowings must be
natural events amenable to scientific study) demanded continuities between science and
philosophy  and  pulled  analytic  philosophy  back  from pure  rationalism (e.g.  Dennett
1991). As the new cognitive and brain sciences emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, they had
benefited from the seeds of pragmatism and began to sow their own; and when analytic
philosophy began to take the brain seriously once again, it encountered these pragmatic
ideas. Rationalist analytic philosophers, strong AI proponents, and excessively cognitivist
researchers  rebelled  against  such  pragmatism.  For  example,  Jerry  Fodor  has  called
pragmatism “the defining catastrophe of analytic philosophy of language and philosophy
of mind” (2003: 73-4). However, some analytic philosophers have been returning to parts
of pragmatism in various ways, driven by respect for science and its discoveries.
8 Recognition that pragmatism was receiving much re-confirmation in the brain sciences
was noticed in the 1990s by scholars such as Mark Johnson (1987, 1993, 2007) and the late
Francisco Varela (1991). Neuroscientists like Jay Schulkin have also recognized pragmatist
themes (Schulkin 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011, and 2012). A younger generation fluent in
both classical pragmatism and the latest neuroscience was in the best position to take
stock  of  matters,  such as  Anthony Chemero,  W.  Teed Rockwell,  and Tibor  Solymosi.
Solymosi recently coined the term “neuropragmatism” (2011a). From its grounding in the
current behavioral and brain sciences, neuropragmatism confirms many core views of
traditional pragmatism. Neuropragmatism continues to reform philosophical views about
such  things  as  the  mind-body  relation,  the  function  of  intelligence,  the  nature  of
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knowledge and truth, the nature of voluntary agency and responsibility, the function of
social morality, and the ethical ways for dealing with new technologies. Along the way, it
distinguishes itself from other neuroscientifically-based philosophical outlooks.
 
Twelve Theses of Neuropragmatism
9 This section offers twelve theses of an ambitious neuropragmatism that deals with core
philosophical issues. The first three are grounded in biology and anthropology. Many
theoretical views across cognitive science and neuroscience regard them as foundational.
1) Animals are goal-oriented organisms, and their nervous systems function to sustain life
in arious practical ways.
2) Cognition in all its manifestions (viz., intelligence, mind, or consciousness) is embodied
and not explicable apart from that bodily context.
3) Human cognition in all its modes should primarily be studied and comprehended in
terms of its practical service for the ways that humans live.
10 Neuropragmatism emphasizes four additional theses, supported by behavioral and brain
sciences, which enlarge the significance of the first three.
4) Cognitive systems are dynamically adaptive to organism-environment interactions, to
deal with shifting conditions of situations as practical goals are pursued.
5) Under pressures from dealing with the environment,  the brain modifies its neural
connections to improve practical performance. The measure of this neural learning is
improved habitual efficiency at specific routine tasks.
6)  Complex  cognitive  processes  are  the  work  of  the  central  and  peripheral  nervous
systems’ effectively coordinating behavior – between bodily systems (e.g., the endocrine
and exocrine systems) and towards unified action of the organism – for reliably achieving
variable goals in a changing environment.
7) Human intelligence has so many cultural features for facilitating cooperative aims that
it should primarily be studied and evaluated largely in terms of its service for socio-
cultural goals.
11 Five more theses of neuropragmatism remain to be mentioned, but we pause here for
some elaboration of the first seven theses.
12 Neuropragmatism is tightly allied with theories of neuroplasticity, the vast unconscious,
reason-emotion-volition integration,  embodied cognition,  and the extended mind.  All
these  theories  have prototypes  in  the works  of  classical  pragmatists.  Combating any
philosophy  of  mind  that  depicts  mind  as  fundamentally  passive,  receptive,
representational,  cognitivist,  or  mechanistic,  the  classical  pragmatists  sought  to
understand the mind in its biological medium. All of the nervous systems in all of their
functionings  for  living  must  be  taken  into  account.  William  James  lent  scientific
respectability to the notion that the fringes and margins of consciousness extend deep
down  into  entirely  unconscious  emotional  and  intuitive  cognition.  The  pragmatists
affirmed that cognition is basically about applying learned habits to ongoing situations
demanding immediate active responses from the organism.  Since the environment is
never  the  same,  cognition  therefore  depends  on  continuous  learning,  which  is  the
dynamic development of specific habits through the nervous systems’ modifications, as
the brain’s neurons grow or modify their interconnections as the organism perceptually
manages its situated experiences of interacting with its world (see James’s statement of
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the brain’s plasticity in James 1890, chap 4). Also recognizing how centers of the brain are
typically involved in many kinds of coordinated tasks, the classical pragmatists resisted
the notion that each part of the brain deals only with narrow tasks or specific sorts of
representations.  As  integrated  phases within  the  continuity  of  brain  processes,  the
traditional schema of perception, reasoning, emotion, and will cannot be mechanically
separate and only temporally related in a series leading to action. Sensation, thought,
feeling, and volition are interfused; they are discriminable but not separable aspects of
the continuous flow of neural activity (Gazzaniga 1992, Damasio 1994, 1999).
13 Neuropragmatism continues pragmatism’s emphasis on the way that human cognition is
not just geared with the world but tightly interwoven into the organism’s interactions
with the environment, forming an organic whole. This fusion makes it impossible to draw
a definitive line between the world beyond the skin of an organism and where cognition
begins. Although the brain is obviously the locus of cognition, it does not necessarily
follow that only brain events suffice to account for all  the functions and features of
cognition. William James’s notion of radical empiricism depends on treating mind and
world  holistically,  and  John  Dewey’s  empirical  naturalism finds  mind  embodied  and
embedded in organismenvironment transactions. In a chapter of Dewey’s 1925 Experience
and Nature, entitled “Nature, Life and Body-Mind,” he writes,
Every “mind” that we are empirically acquainted with is found in connection with
some organized  body.  Every  such  body  exists  in  a  natural  medium to  which  it
sustains  some  adaptive  connection...  The  natural  medium  is  thus  one  which
contains similar and conjunctive forms. At every point and stage, accordingly, a
living organism and its  life  processes involve a world or nature temporally and
spatially “external” to itself but “internal” to its functions. (Dewey 1925/LW1: 212)
14 The organism’s effective coordination of modifying its environment (natural and social)
exemplifies cognition. Pragmatism has always refused to treat neurons (and any other
brain cells such as glia which may modulate brain activity) as the exclusive place where
cognitive meaning is enacted – neurons are essential to, but not entirely constitutive of,
cognition. Neuroscience properly studies the interrelated processes of brain activity, but
cognitive neuroscience cannot help explain the processes of learning and knowing by
referencing brain activity alone in isolation from any context. Philosophy, for its part,
will be unable to show how to integrate body and mind if knowledge is examined quite
apart  from any  bodily  context.  Pragmatism’s  resistance  to  atomistic  and  reductivist
naturalisms is nowhere more evident than in its treatment of experience and mind as
dynamic, systemic, contextual, ecological, and social.
15 Biology cannot study life with utter disregard for the environment; nervous systems qua
biological systems must not be studied any differently. The same goes doubly for the
functions in which such systems take part, such as cognition. Cognition, therefore, is not
to be solely done within the head in the end but is rather understood in terms of life and
living within environments. Grounding mind in biology takes life seriously. What are the
existential truths of life? As Michael Schwartz and Osborne Wiggins describe life, there
cannot be any firm or fixed divisions between organic bodies and their environment.
Schwartz and Wiggins offer the following existential truths about life:
1. Being vs.  non-being:  Always threatened by non-being,  the organism must constantly re-
assert its being through its own activity.
2. World-relatedness  vs.  self-enclosure:  Living  beings  are  both  enclosed  with  themselves,
defined by the boundaries that separate them from their environment, while they are also
ceaselessly reaching out to their environment and engaging in transactions with it.
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3. Dependence  vs.  independence:  Living  beings  are  both  dependent  on  the  material
components that constitute them at any given moment and independent of any particular
groupings of these components over time (Schwartz and Wiggins 2010).
16 What is true of life is also true of mind: mind cannot be comprehended except through
what it does, and what mind does is transcend itself by ceaselessly modifying its lived
environment. By studying those modes of modification the mind is studied, and nowhere
else. At no time does an organism’s activities or cognition deal with some ‘external world’
that can be specified independently from the organism. An organism can neither perceive
nor interact with ‘the world at large,’ but only confront its own ‘life-world’ that it can
experience and modify. There is no point to first specifying what the external world is
like  and  then  asking  how  an  organism  cognizes  that  world.  Neuropragmatism,  like
classical  pragmatism  before  it,  studies  cognition  as  it  actually  transforms  the  lived
environment. The organism’s environment is not the same as the external world. Jacob
von Uexküll used the term Umwelt for the ‘life-world’ that a species tries to grapple with.
Dewey’s conception of ‘experience’ as doing-undergoing, Heidegger’s use of Erlebnis, and
Richard Lewontin’s environmental constructivism similarly point to this conception of
the available life-world with-in which cognition does its work (see von Uexküll  1926,
Lewontin 1985, Godfrey-Smith 1998, Thompson 2007, Berthoz and Christen 2009).
17 In a basic sense, the sciences all realize how cognition is localizable to organic bodies
dealing with their environments, and that cognition cannot be spiritually or Platonically
independent from organic matter. Pragmatism, and neuropragmatism, tend to agree with
recent theories about ‘embodied cognition’ that offer more specific implications of this
organic embodiment for humanity. As Margaret Wilson expresses embodied cognition’s
claims (Wilson 2002), cognition is situated by taking place in the context of a real-world
environment, and inherently involves perception and action. Wilson recounts the ways
that cognition is for action. The function of the mind is to guide action, and things, such
as  perception  and  memory,  must  be  understood  in  terms  of  their  contribution  to
situationappropriate behavior. Cognition must be understood in terms of how it functions
under the pressure of real-time interaction with the environment.
18 The invention of symbolic representation and written language takes advantage of the
way that cognition specializes in dealing with transactions with deliberately modified
aspects  of  the  environment.  Human  cognition  can  off-load  cognitive  work  onto  the
symbolic  environment  so  that  it  holds  or  even  manipulates  information  for  us.  We
harvest that information on a need-to-know basis. That makes the environment part of
the cognitive system. The information flow between brain, body, and world is so dense
and continuous that, for scientists studying the nature of cognitive activity, the often
used term ‘mind/brain’ is not a sufficiently meaningful unit of analysis. The production of
cognitive  activity  does  not  come from any  such “mind/brain”  alone  but  rather  is  a
dynamic  nexus  of  brain,  body  and  the  environmental  situation.  These  interactions
become part of our cognitive systems. Our thinking, decision making, and future are all
impacted by our environmental transactions.
19 These core views of  neuropragmatism and (non-representational)  embodied cognitive
science can be extended to form judgments on classical philosophical problems about the
mind-body relation, the natural basis for the highest cognitive functions, and the cultural
origin of creative reasoning. For human cognition, managing the lived environment is not
just  biological  but  social  as  well.  We  must  regularly  manage  each  other  and  our
institutions.  Distinctively human cognition is from birth (and perhaps before birth) a
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matter  of  brains  cognizing together  in  concert.  For  humans,  experience  is  culture  –
cognizing the environment is thoroughly shaped by the transmitted modes of cultural
activities engaging human nervous system.
20 Additional  theses  of  neuropragmatism,  together  distinguishing  it  from  most  other
neurophilosophies, suggest ways to handle these issues.
8) Cartesian materialism still pervades too much psychology and philosophy of mind by
demanding strict localization of rationality, prioritization of self-consciousness’s powers,
and the quest for perfect representational knowledge of a fixed external world. The brain
exhibits  much  dedicated  modular  architecture,  but  massive  parallel  and  networked
processing is dominant. The brain is not hierarchical, but more democratic. Nerve centers
across the brains are intricately interconnected with each other, so most any part of the
brain has some direct or indirect systemic link to every other part of the brain. There is
no  inner  Cartesian  theater  where  all  information  is  gathered  and  simultaneously
experienced;  experience  at  best  displays  rough  continuities.  There  is  no  executive
command  center  giving  orders  to  the  rest  of  the  brain;  deliberation  at  best  guides
habitual motor action. Ordinary cognition does not primarily aim at static representation
in general but at dynamic adequacy in specific situations.
9) The most sophisticated modes of human cognition are developments and assemblages
of lower-level cognitive processes. These complex modes of thought, seemingly far from
mere matter or biology, remain embodied and functional for practical success. Higher
selfconscious cognitive processes (reflection, inference, hypothesis testing) are socially
invented and taught capacities to attentively focus on ways to generalize practical habits
for flexible use.  These higher social  capacities serve to coordinate group cooperative
practices where some creativity is needed to maintain efficiency in the face of unstable
conditions.  Among  these  social  practices  are  linguistic  communication,  symbolic
representation, and logical inference. As our notion of the “self” is bound up with these
capacities, the self must be another socially constructed artifact of culture.
10)  Imagination  and  memory1 add  a  contemplative  ‘space’  where  techniques  can  be
experimentally attempted on related problems. Even pure imagination, conceptual play,
and  aesthetic  contemplation  are  creative  capacities  existing  to  refine  practice,  even
though we can also perform them in isolation from practical concerns. These creative
modes  permitted,  among  other  things,  the  fixation  of  concepts  and  select  relations
among concepts, leading to reasoning. The most complex modes of rational thinking (i.e.,
logic, scientific method) are refined developments from integrating component cognitive
processes.  Such  things  as  logic,  science,  and  all  sophisticated  modes  of  creative
intelligence are culturally-designed and educationally-transmitted technologies.
11) Knowledge is the result of experimental problem solving. The epistemic criteria for
knowledge is the technological test of practicality.  Scientific knowledge is continuous
with  technology  and  ordinary  practical  skill.  Much  of  human  experience,  most  of
morality, and all of knowledge are emergent features of social epistemic practices. All a
priori, conceptual, and linguistic truths are internal to a social epistemic practice, and
cannot be directly or simply used to criticize some other practice. Because no a priori
conceptual rigidity can dictate terms of empirical adequacy, only the practical adequacy
of a knowledge system is relevant to its validity. For example, no folk belief system rules
over any scientific field, and scientific fields should respect pluralism and seek coherence,
not unity. By avoiding epistemic dualism and reductivist monism, both epistemology and
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ethics can be naturalized, by showing how they fit in the natural world of encultured
humans.
12)  What  seem to  be  ‘a  priori’  and necessary  truths  are  only  habits  of  cognition so
habitually  ingrained  that  our  brains  either  use  them unconsciously  or  our  thinking
predominantly relies on them without question. Evolution produced the infant human
brain capable of speedily acquiring crucial functional habits because all humans need
them, and additional functional habits are acquired when culture indoctrinates them into
children. Habits are not unyielding reflexes; advanced learning is capable of questioning
and amending any a priori truth through empirical inquiry and science. Because the a
priori does not float freely from actual brain development, learning, and language, there
is no logic-practice gap. Reason can be naturalized, because its processes and results can
be shown to fit in the natural world of embodied and encultured humans.
21 These  twelve  theses  of  neuropragmatism  permit  it  to  offer  an  ambitious
neurophilosophy. Having stated these core theses of neuropragmatism, we may step back
and survey wider intersections of neuroscience and philosophy. To establish itself as a
fully  legitimate  neurophilosophy  with  a  claim  to  some  leadership  role,
neuropragmatism’s mode of dealing with the mind must be scrutinized.
 
Neuropragmatism and the Mind
22 Leaving behind reductionism and eliminativism, pragmatism has always sought ways to
show how to avoid dualism and representationalism. The Cartesian claim that mind and
body  have  entirely  different  properties  is  demonstrably  false.  Lingering  claims  that
consciousness has unnatural properties similarly rest on philosophical confusions and
ignorance  of  brain  science.  Mental  activity,  conscious  and  unconscious,  is  a  natural
process involving the nervous system – as such it is entirely open to scientific inquiry.
23 Neurophilosophy and neuropragmatism can show how to coordinate the functionalities
of thought with the functionalities of nervous systems. Examples include: thinking and
nerve activity  both have temporal  durations;  they are both found in localized living
centers  rather  than  diffused  through  all  of  nature;  they  both  consist  of  relational
continuities rather than atomic accumulations; they are both dynamic rather than static;
they both display growth and decay; they both function in attending to practical dealings
with the environment; they both primarily aim at maintaining the organism’s well-being.
Even  the  most  ‘subjective’  parts  of  consciousness,  such  as  the  feelings  and  qualia
noticeable  in  self-consciousness,  are  aspects  of  the  dynamically  functional  flow  of
thought. No pragmatism would seek to ‘reduce’ felt qualia to nervous activity or anything
else to prove that they are natural. The old metaphysical formula demanding identity of
all properties for genuine identity was rejected early on by pragmatism and is no longer
taken seriously beyond arm-chair philosophy. For science, functional identity is quite
sufficient:  where  two  phenomena  are  strongly  correlated  and  display  the  same
functionalities,  the two phenomena are rightly regarded as the same natural  process
observed from different perspectives. Qualitative feelings happen where nervous systems
achieve certain degrees of complexity in their transaction with their respective bodies.
Subjectivity need not be treated as anything spookily “unnatural.” The mysteriousness of
subjectivity  quite  vanishes.  Subjectivity  and perspective are  precisely  what  would be
naturally expected when specific brains generate specific experiences. You have a very
different perspective from anyone else, because you are directly experiencing through
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your unique nexus of your brain, body, and world, and not from mine or any other’s
nexus.
24 The lived experience of cognition reflects its neurological basis. Unscientific philosophies
point to features of experience or thought allegedly lacking dynamic functionality or
integration with action. Worse, anti-naturalistic philosophies further claim that scientific
naturalism  can  never  integrate  them  with  energetic  matter.  However,  neurological
investigations (much less any sound phenomenology, such as that of pragmatists) have
not been able to confirm such static and aloof features of consciousness. Interestingly,
such supposedly ‘pure’ or ‘inert’ parts of experience (sense data, intense qualia, and the
like) are actually detectable by those seeking them only after the most intense cognitive
effort to distill  them from the ordinary flow of active experience. There simply is no
avoiding dynamic and creative cognition. Consciousness is intensely qualitative, to be
sure,  precisely  because  the  brain  puts  so  much work into  that  phase  of  experience.
Theories of mind comfortable with taking purity, passivity, receptivity, or representation
as basic modes of cognition must be rejected as incompatible with neuroscience. All the
same, neuroscience is at liberty to develop specialized theories about micro and macro
brain systems, borrowing and modifying terms as it may require. No folk psychology or
linguistic conventionalism can dictate terms of scientific inquiry into the nexus of brain,
body, and world. The dream of the unity of science having dissipated, teleological and
intentional terms can be legitimate features of successful empirical studies at every level
from the social to the synaptic (although mechanistic causality seems to dominate at
molecular  levels).  Indeed,  the  choice  between teleological  and mechanistic  modes  of
explanation may not be forced. Some naturalisms, like Dewey’s, propose that mechanism
is visible in teleological systems when analyzed closely enough, but it only means that
teleology requires mechanistic parts even while no mechanistic explanation could ever
suffice for the whole. After all, wholes typically have genuine powers and properties that
no  aggregate  of  parts  could  have.  This  is  not  duplication  of  causal  powers,  as
reductionists  fret,  but only  the  recognition  of  compatible  kinds  of  causal  powers  at
different  scales  and  systems  of  nature.  The  pluralistic  stance  of  pragmatism  and
neuropragmatism is hospitable to continuities of terminology and causality at multiple
levels of brain science.
25 Higher human cognition can occasionally  achieve sustained reflective passivity,  open
receptivity  to  experience,  and sophisticated representations  of  the so-called external
world.  Neuropragmatism cannot  deny that  humans can do these  things.  Yet  it  must
undertake  explanations  for  their  existence  without  permitting  them  to  assume  any
fundamental role in ordinary cognition. Neuropragmatism tends to favor the idea that
sophisticated symbolic capacities of human intelligence are the scaffolding on which the
extended  mind  of  linguistic  sociality  operates.  Basic  cognition  is  not  symbolic  or
representational;  but human societies design their environments in ways that offload
cognitive work onto the manipulation of external symbols. Rationalism in general makes
it difficult to account for cognition and knowledge in any natural terms. Cartesianism was
the  height  of  presumptive  rationalism  by  taking  our  most  sophisticated  forms  of
communication (replete with analytic meanings and necessary truths) as essential to all
consciousness and cognition.  Later representationalisms sustained this obsession with
static symbols, rendering it difficult to naturalistically explain even how children acquire
linguistic competence.
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26 Neither  static  nor  computational  representation  characterizes  ordinary  cognition.
Reliance on representation leads to a postulation of foundational perceptions. However,
experience is not ‘built up’ from purer building blocks of direct information from nature.
Connectionism comes closer to dynamical and distributed cognition but may still contain
aspects  or  elements  of  representationalism.  Neuropragmatism,  like  other
neurophilosophies, takes close notice of the way that the brain rapidly merges diverse
streams of stimuli from all sources in order to guide effective action in the lived moment.
All  cognitive  processes  (and  hence  all  conscious  experiences  too)  are  fusings  of
information about external sensations, motor control processes, and internal feedback
from the body. There is no pure sensation, no pure will, and no pure feeling. There are no
dichotomies between sensation, emotion, and reason – these aspects of cognition work
together as they guide behavior. Even in the simplest case of behavior, these fusions are
evident.  Simplistic  associationism  is  inadequate  because  organic  circuits  create  new
wholes that are not merely sums or sequences of their parts. In a genuine organic circuit
of perception, action, and consequence (e.g., the child’s reaching for a flame, only to learn
that fire painfully burns), the meaning of the perception includes the prior action done to
gain that perception (e.g., the turning of the gaze towards an object); the meaning of the
action includes both a desire (e.g., to touch that object) and more perception (e.g., to
guide the reaching); and the meaning of the consequences of the touching includes the
guided action of touching (e.g., the felt pain is not just felt pain, but the pain of touching
that object). The next time the child sees the flame, he sees a hot flame, and when he
reaches for that flame, he reaches for a painful touch. From now on, for that child, an idea
of touching that flame simultaneously contains the idea of pain (this sort of example is
discussed in James 1890 and Dewey 1896/EW5).
27 In general, most of the meaning in perceiving things consists of anticipations of potential
reactions upon dealing with those things (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008; Iacoboni 2008).
Organic circuits result in holistic organic wholes of experience. Experience is thoroughly
imbued with prospective values of action. That is why we directly experience meanings
and values in the world around us. If meanings or values were only interior mental states,
then  our  experience  of  an  external  object  would be  stereoscopic,  a  sort  of  double
perception. We would observe the external object as a meaningless material thing, and
simultaneously observe it as a useful object to be employed, as if one ‘eye’ saw the world
as it is in itself, while another ‘eye’ saw objects as meaningful and valuable. Does lived
experience ever seem like this? Hardly – we immediately and directly observe significant,
meaningful,  and valuable objects  without  any double ‘vision’  or  contrast  between an
external world and an internal world. Meanings and values are where they appear to be:
embodied in the things that we know how to use. Meanings and values are instances of
achieved  practical  knowledge  through  learning.  Knowledge  is  built  up  from  our
experimental  attempts  to  productively  manage  our  deliberate  modifications  to  the
environment.  Static  representationalism,  correspondence  theories  of  knowledge,  and
Cartesian materialism are not viable theories of mind and intelligence. Neuropragmatism
allies  easily  with  theories  of  active  perception  (Hurley  1998,  Noë  2005,  Pred  2005);
somaesthetics  (Shusterman  2008);  naturalizing  intention  (Grammont  et  al.  2010);
ecological  psychology  (Gibson 1986,  Heft  2001);  ecological  cybernetics  (Bateson 1972,
Hoffmeyer, ed. 2008); social cognition and social epistemology (Fuller 1988, Wilson 2004);
neurosociology (Franks 2010); extended mind (Clark 1997, 2008; Noë 2009; Menary 2010);
neurophenomenology (Varela, et al. 1991, Petitot, et al. 1999, Gallagher 2005, Thompson
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2007),  and  radical  embodied  cognitive  science  (Chemero  2009).  Even  aspects  of
connectionism and dynamic systems theory may contribute to the proper synthesis of
these positions (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2002), provided excessive representationalism
is avoided (Freeman 2001, Rockwell 2005).
28 To ask, “Is mind just in the brain?” is problematic. ‘Mind’ is ambiguous: it can refer to the
localized centers of cognitive processing, or it can refer to the networked channels of
meaningful information. Localized mind is where brains act; philosophical options are
common  substantial  cause,  or  dual  aspect  monism,  or  outright  ontological  identity.
Networked mind is wherever brains are coordinating action through communication, and
therefore much of intelligence is an emergent feature of human communities modifying
environments. Mind is dependent on brains, and cognitive functions are brain functions,
either of single or multiple brains. Neurons are all about systemic communication, across
synapses  and  across  the  room.  Many  cognitive  functions  (and  all  higher  cognitive
functions) only operate through people – viz., social organisms with nervous systems – in
communication with each other about  the common environment.  Human psychology
must be social and ecological.
29 The ‘theory of  mind’  ways of  trying to explain how humans try to understand each
other’s beliefs and motivations take matters exactly backwards. We do not really start
from our own concepts  of  what  constitute  the mental  life  and tentatively test  them
against the empirical data of others’ behaviors. For babies could never do any such thing.
To presume so is to believe as if each baby was born a positivistic scientist or a cultural
anthropologist. Infant brains do respond to others’ behaviors, like displays of emotion,
but  they  respond  not  with  thought  but  with  deed.  Because  feelings  are  intimately
connected with behaviors (through such things as systems of mirror neurons), it is the
joint behaviors that build up the mind. The baby is doing the same things as the adult, not
thinking the same things as the adult. The pragmatist always looks to the social behaviors
underlying cognition. After all, how could the developing infant brain be using complex
concepts so soon to interpret adult behaviors? Rationalists might suppose that they are,
but babies do not need such refinements so soon (and given the diversity of cultures, it is
a good thing that babies do not need them – for the diversity of cultures shows that they
do not have them).
30 Generally, first we comprehend the minds of others by living with them in infanc y and
childhood,  and  then  we  gradually  apply  cognitive  categories  to  our  own developing
modes of experience. Babies are born individuated but not as individual selves. Babies do
not start out as solipsists, intimately acquainted with their private mental states while
ignorant of those of others. It is not enough merely to have a consciousness of passing
mental states – higher human cognition about individual minds is far more than just
being awake and aware of one’s environment. Sustained mental individuality is far more
complex than having passing mental states. Put another way, a child gradually learns
how to treat people as having mental individuality right along with her own growing
sense of mental individuality. A child only gradually develops the notion that she has an
internal  mental  life,  distinguishable  from  her  absorption  in  her  environment,  by
participating in the living cognition of the community around her. For example, knowing
what beliefs are, and knowing that one has beliefs as distinguished from the beliefs of
others,  is  a  far  more  sophisticated  ability  than  merely  having  transient  beliefs.
Individuality is an emergent social category, not a biological or metaphysical category –
no one is  born as an individual  self.  Like every other role,  one learns how to be an
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individual only within a community (and that is why different cultures apply differing
notions of individuality). The way that even babies have personalities is not a refutation,
but a confirmation of this social theory of the self, since the growing infant learns how to
be treated as an individual by being treated in ways particular to her personality (and
only later on will she realize that she has a personality). Although there are numerous
broad continuities between animal and human cognition (Fetzer 2005, Hoffmeyer 2008),
as  would  be  expected given  evolution,  human  cognition  displays  some notable
discontinuities from animal mind because we are now so intensely cultured animals. By
taking  higher  cognition  and  self-conciousness,  like  all  human  communication,  as
fundamentally social, neuropragmatism is aligned with Peircean semiotics (Peirce 1991,
Sebeok 2001), the social mind (Valsiner and van der Veer 2000), symbolic interactionism
(Blumer 1969), developmental consciousness (Bogdan 2010), and biosemiotics (Barbieri
2008).
31 Cognition and culture are thoroughly natural.  The biological  evolution of  the human
species, and the cultural evolution of complex human associations, suffice to explain all
features  of  cognition.2 The two modes of  evolution are not  disjunctive –  no form of
cognition is  independent from either mode,  although most  complex forms of  human
cognition are primarily cultural in origin and function. Nothing spiritual or supernatural
is  needed to account for mind.  The highest  modes of  human cognition aim at  social
competence,  technological  expertise,  and  knowledge  of  reality.  Culture  educates
members  of  society  into  various  forms  of  responsible  intelligence  and  expects  their
satisfactory use for group goals. These cognitive modes amount to technological skill and
ultimately answer to pragmatic criteria of success set by societies. Basically, culture is
technology. Social learning and teaching was the first technology, and all else followed
(Sterelny  2012).  All  epistemology  must  be  social  and  technological;  no  philosophical
theory of reason, knowledge, or truth can float freely apart from learning’s origins in
education and experimentation, or avoid answerability to practical social  justification
within cultural contexts.
32 Objectivity  aiming  at  warranted  truth  is  possible  through commonly  accepted  social
standards of responsible practices for dealing with the environment. Both society and
nature provide the empirical checks on postulated theories. Because we are an evolved
species, and social epistemology and reason can be naturalized, there is sufficient reason
to be critical realists: we can be confident that cognition tracks the general features of
nature, and confident that science is gradually becoming more reliable about tracking the
fine details of natural processes. We do not have to worry that human knowledge may be
wildly incorrect or ignorant about the environment. Nature is not some mysterious ‘thing
in itself.’ For we can explore and understand nature, with much thanks to our cultural
activities that have grown from natural processes for getting about in nature in the first
place.
33 The role of reason and the problem of ‘free will’ need to be dramatically re-thought. The
‘decisions’ that occur during conscious deliberation are not some sort of instantaneous
moments,  or  detached  initiators  of  voluntary  conduct,  or  products  of  emotionally
detached  rationality.  Conscious  monitoring  of  conduct  is  thoroughly  interfused  with
ongoing motor control of muscles and internal and external sensory feedback. Agency
consists  of  a  capacity  to  creatively  refine  control  over  habitual  practice  by  judging
observed  success,  so  both  frontal  and  motor  cortex  regions  are  simultaneously  and
interrelatedly involved. Conscious deliberation is therefore broadly distributed across the
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cortex, and not just some ‘after the fact’ reporting of what some unconscious processing
does entirely on its own. Proposals that consciousness does no work guiding conduct
must postulate both epiphenomenalism and epicognitivism. Epiphenomenalism declares
consciousness to be real but powerless, an after-the-fact ghostly spectator on the life of
the  brain.  Epicognitivism  offers  a  cortical  basis  (some  call  it  the  ‘interpreter’)  for
epiphenomenalism, but its postulation of a surplus brain center that does no real work
clashes  with  evolution.  Brain  centers  that  generate  consciousness  must  have  an
efficacious role in conduct (as James argued in 1890). This conclusion does not mean that
consciousness  as  such has  its  own natural  causal  powers  (there  is  no  route  back  to
dualism or Cartesian materialism here), but only that consciousness of higher cognitive
efficacy is no illusion, but an accurate report. Indeed, for pragmatic naturalism, holding
that consciousness is a real aspect of the natural efficacies of higher brain cognition can
make sense.
34 Reflective deliberation is therefore no illusion or irrelevant luxury either: it is a useful
imaginative function for specialized human cognition for problem solving. Responsibility
in turn is the degree to which one can successfully use reflective deliberation to guide
conduct in socially appropriate ways. As philosophers from John Locke to John Dewey
(1932) and Daniel Dennett (2003) have argued, our capacities for practical deliberation,
normative conduct, and degrees of moral freedom naturally grow together and remain
culturally fused together. The intense degree of human sociality accounts for the way our
species encourages normative conduct using normative moral responsibility in addition
to the older primate emotional motivations of love, kindness, and charity. However, the
intense sociality of human life requires the thoughtful management and adjustment of
multiple  social  roles  and  responsibilities,  in  turn  requiring  dynamic  moral  problem
solving  about  what  to  do  from  situation  to  situation.  Moral  concepts  such  as
responsibility,  freedom,  autonomy,  and  blame  have  distinctive  functional  roles  in
creatively sustaining the community life of human societies.
 
Neuropragmatism and Neurophilosophy: Conflict Over
Image
35 William James was among the first philosophers to take brain science and what is now
called embodied cognition to be highly relevant for all core philosophical issues, as his
monumental The Principles of Psychology illustrates. The pragmatist force of James’s vision
of  all  of  nature’s  interrelated  processes,  including  mind,  is  carried  on through John
Dewey’s philosophy. As Dewey wrote,
To see the organism in nature, the nervous system in the organism, the brain in the
nervous system, the cortex in the brain is the answer to the problems which haunt
philosophy. And when thus seen they will be seen to be in, not as marbles are in a
box  but  as  events  are  in  history,  in  a  moving,  growing  never  finished  process.
(Dewey 1925/LW1: 224)
36 This statement is clearly a statement of neurophilosophy and supplies what the authors
endorse as the neuropragmatist’s motto (see Solymosi 2011a). It goes all the way from
synapse to society; from cortex to culture. While many neurophilosophers today may
appreciate Dewey’s bold claim here, it is worth noting that the standard orthodoxy of
most neurophilosophers is inadequately pragmatic and overly Sellarsian or positivistic.
That is, their understanding of experience, and thus science, is simplistic. According to
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the neurophilosophical orthodoxy, the main concern for philosophy is the reconciliation
of two opposing views of humanity, the scientific on the one hand and the manifest or
humanistic on the other. The job of philosophy is to navigate the rapprochement of these
two views.
37 While  there  is  some  disagreement  on  the  nature  of  this  reconciliation  –  generally
understood,  the  conflict’s  most  popular  solutions  have  been  eliminativism  and
constructivism  –  the  neuropragmatist  solution  to  the  conflict  is  to  reconstruct  the
philosophical notion of science’s aims and results that leads to competition between the
two images in the first place. This conflict, however, is not merely a theoretical problem
for philosophers.  It  has manifested itself  socially in the academy as the two cultures
described by C. P. Snow (1959). There is a desperate need for rapprochement of some sort,
as there are real life consequences across the life sciences and out beyond the ivory tower
into areas like public policy.
38 Despite great similarities between mainstream neurophilosophy and neuropragmatism,
there  is  a  crucial  difference  between  them.3 This  difference  resides  in  the  different
conceptions of experience. This difference subsequently sets up distinct conceptions of
science, and therefore different resolutions to the conflict between the scientific image
and the humanistic or manifest image.
39 The philosophical  project  of  rapprochement  is  taken up in various ways by the many
philosophical traditions. The specific differences between mainstream neurophilosophy
and neuropragmatism come down to how the problem is articulated and thus how it is
solved in light of that articulation. Generally speaking, however, the conflict is a genuine
one felt by most parties. The concern is that the scientific image ultimately shows the
humanistic  one to  be illusory,  thereby bringing into serious  doubt  genuinely  human
concerns about dignity, freedom, responsibility, and living a good and meaningful life.
Science, it is feared, will rob us of our humanity.
40 For mainstream neurophilosophers, like Paul and Patricia Churchland, Owen Flanagan,
and Daniel Dennett, their conception of science differs in significant respects from the
neuropragmatists’  view.  Moreover,  the  conception of  cultural  tradition,  what  Wilfrid
Sellars influentially called the manifest image, similarly differs between neurphilosophy
and  neuropragmatism.  The  main  distinction  is  the  difference  in  how  each  position
conceives of experience, and subsequently of science. Patricia Churchland (1986: 302-3;
and 2002: 107-12) articulates the problem in terms of scientific theory versus folk theory,
and then, as she often does in the latter work, refers to Quine and his pragmatism. The
neuropragmatism we advance here is similar to this branch of neopragmatism but, as will
become  clearer,  stands  in  stark  contrast  to  the  conception  of  science  based  on  an
inadequate  conception  of  experience.  The  Churchlands  (1998:  25ff)  continue  this
discussion in terms of  folk psychology versus scientific  psychology,  and mention the
origins of these ideas in Sellars (ibid: 4ff). Paul Churchland further distances himself from
pragmatism in his recent book (2012: 128ff; see Rockwell 2011 for a strong treatment of
Churchland’s  previous  pragmatist  leanings).  Flanagan’s  recent  statement  of  his
philosophical  project  is  in  these  terms  but  with  a  greater  pluralism,  extending  the
Sellarsian dyad to a sextet (see 2007: 5ff). Dennett (2008) is also a clear and accessible
statement  of  the  problem,  even  as  he  has  unwittingly  affirmed  most  of  the
neuropragmatist materials for its solution.
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41 While both positions see the manifest or humanist image developing first and providing
the  framework  out  of  which  science  and  its  image  develop,  mainstream
neurophilosophers see the two images as competing with each other for the truth. The
truth of science is taken as value-free and objective, whereas the truth of the manifest
image is value-laden and subjective. Notice that this conflict is yet another version of
mind-body dualism, in which the properties of each, science and culture, are mutually
exclusive. Sellars articulates the question that philosophy faces as this: “How, then, are
we to evaluate the conflicting claims of the manifest image and the scientific image thus
provisionally interpreted to constitute the true and, in principle, complete account of man-
in-the-world?” (Sellars 1963: 25)
42 This conflict  is  generated for mainstream neurophilosophy largely due to residues of
logical positivism, which is based on a Humean conception of experience. Like Descartes’s
rationalistic view of the soul, Hume’s empiricism fits the model of the spectator theory of
mind that Dewey criticized. Today we recognize such a view as Cartesian materialism.
While  neurophilosophers  like  the  Churchlands,  Dennett,  and Flanagan would balk  at
being  called  Cartesian  materialists,  they  succumb  to  the  modified  account  of  it  (as
described by Rockwell 2005). It may not be that there is one specific place in the brain
where experience all  comes together,  but they suppose that there is  a specific space
delimiting experience: the brain itself.
43 The neuropragmatist denies this limited range of experience or mentation. Recall the
neuropragmatist’s motto: that the problems of philosophy are generated from the failure
to recognize the dynamic processes embedded within larger processes; that the cortex is
in the brain, the brain in the nervous system, the nervous system in the organism, and
the organism in nature; that, moreover, each of these ‘things’ are not simple or static
substances but dynamic and growing processes. When thus seen, we are better speaking
not of mind as a noun but of mind as a verb: an organism does not have a mind, rather an
organism minds. Indeed, our scientific activity should not be inquiring into the mind but
into the process of minding. Mentation goes beyond the cranium, suspended in a cultural
medium  of  communicating  humans.  Neuropragmatism  would  not  achieve  the
naturalization of consciousness and mentality by limiting it to a single brain, ignoring
how  human  brains  become  distinctively  human  only  when  wired  together.  If  other
neurophilosophers cannot see the ‘wires’ of sight and sound that is because a too narrow
scientism has rendered those into meaningless physical entities already. One might as
well do that to all the signaling wires of the nervous system and be done with meaning
altogether. Avoiding that eliminative dead end, the only alternative is to take seriously
the way that both the phenomenology of lived human experience and the physicality of
brains interacting with each other and the environment exist in natural spaces much
larger  than the  confines  of  any  cranium taken singly.  It  seems  like  we  are  directly
experiencing  the  external  world  because  we  really  are.  The  unsurprising  fact  that
complex natural systems of brains and environments can be distorted and deceived into
illusions and hallucinations no more proves that consciousness is all in one’s head than
hacking a computer network proves that the world wide web is all in one’s computer.
44 Even where some mainstream neurophilosophers would not deny that experience and
intelligence are partially social, they have not dealt with the full implications of viewing
humans and all  their  cognitive products as  encultured.  Another problematic residual
aspect of Humean experience in logical positivism is the maintenance of the fact/value
dichotomy (Putnam 2002).  This  issue,  too,  is  complex as  each of  the aforementioned
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neurophilosophers have held varying views throughout their careers.  Regardless,  this
dichotomy fits the general pattern that neuropragmatism seeks to eliminate. Among the
reasons mainstream neurophilosophers have such difficulty in their efforts to reconcile
the manifest image with the scientific image is the question of what to do with value (or
mentality) in an ontology of value-free facts (or bodies)? Eliminativism is one strategy;
constructivism is another. The former fails to keep the sacred aspect of the manifest
image, which many find a dissatisfying, if  not a terrifying proposal.  The latter is left
making qualifications upon qualifications about what is meant by manifest terms like
consciousness in ways that end up making their readers wonder whether consciousness is
real or illusory. This too is unsatisfying.
45 The residues of ordinary language philosophy and the ‘linguistic turn,’ which is based on
a neo-Kantian view of  cultural  mind,  have not helped matters.  By encouraging some
philosophers to suppose that they have privileged access to analytic truths grounded in
enlanguaged culture, a battle arose between linguistic a priorists and neurophilosophers
over who had the right to dictate the nature of the self. This battle only sustained the
dualistic terms of the debate into the late twentieth century, as neurophilosophers felt
pushed  into  viewing  culture  as  a  competitor  to  the  scientific  image  of  humanity.
Ironically,  humanists  fearful  of  scientism  have  only  perpetuated  the  worry  over  an
inhuman theory of self which an improved cognitive neuroscience would prevent.
46 Neuropragmatism evades these problems of dualism by integrating science and culture.
Neuropragmatism conceives of science (like all modes of intelligence) as an inherently
evaluative and thus value-laden method that provides provisional instrumental truths as
guides to practical action in the world – not a method of justifying static propositions
that objectively mirror or correspondingly represent the non-human external world. This
difference between conceptions  of  science is  central  to  understanding the difference
between neurophilosophical  reconciliation and neuropragmatic  reconstruction.  In  his
articulation of  the conflict  between science and common sense (i.e.  the humanist  or
manifest image), Dewey argues that the subject-matter of both science and common sense
is  one  and  the  same.  The  subject-matter  is  experience,  conceived  as  the  dynamic
interaction  of  organism  and  environment:  “Things  interacting  in  certain  ways  are 
experience” (Dewey 1925/LW1: 12); experience is “the manifestation of the interaction of
organism and environment” or simply “an interaction of organism and environment”
(Dewey 1939, 531). What distinguishes science from common sense is the mode of inquiry,
specifically the experimental method developed into the sophisticated technological and
industrial affair that produces the most secure knowledge humanity has about the world
to date.
47 Dewey argues that common sense is concerned first and foremost with “practical uses
and enjoyments” of our existential situation, “with ‘the ordinary affairs of life,’ in the
broad sense of life” (Dewey 1938/LW1: 71-2, 69). Another important point Dewey makes
about common sense is that it is not static and fixed but always changing in response to
the dynamic environment.  We see this  progression in the history of  the humanities,
broadly  speaking,  from myth  to  mythology  to  dogma  and  scripture  to  Chaucer  and
Shakespeare through to contemporary poetry, novels, films, and so forth. In one way or
another, these affairs are concerned with our everyday lives, not as isolated events but as
living experiences, as social interactions with each other in a world, actual and imagined.
Through them we see how life could be lived and could be experienced (Bywater 2010).
They not only affect our consciousnesses but bring about qualities in both familiar and
Neuropragmatism: A Neurophilosophical Manifesto
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, V-1 | 2013
16
novel ways so as to encourage or admonish specific ways of life. They are at the heart of
our  moral  lives.  In  abstracting beyond the particulars  of  common sense,  Sellars  and
others end up stopping or freezing a dynamic living process. Snapshots have their place,
surely,  but to take the snapshot for the whole is to lose out on the entirety and the
richness of life.
48 Science develops out of the same subject matter as common sense, with a concern for
practical affairs of ordinary everyday life. When wholly successful, the results and the
methods developed by science feedback into the commonsense world “in a way that
enormously refines, expands and liberates the contents and agencies at the disposal of
common sense” (Dewey 1938/LW12: 72). Unfortunately, Dewey notes, this feedback has
not been nearly as successful as it needs to be, never amounting to more than providing
new tools for upholding tradition, yet never fully critiquing tradition. This is due in part
to the tendency of  the practitioners  and outside observers  of  science to finalize  the
results and methods of science. Sellars does this in setting up the opposition between the
manifest and scientific images as though they both could be the complete and the final
word on matters. Dewey describes the dissolution of the problem of reconciliation when
we see that “[s]cientific subject-matter is intermediate, not final and complete in itself” (
ibid.,  72).  Science  is  a  provisional  and ongoing cultural  technology,  one  of  the  most
humanistic endeavors humans undertake.
49 Taken and frozen at any intermediate stage, however, the products of scientific inquiry
seem to be isolated objects, set apart from the situations in which they were originally
encountered. As science progresses, it becomes ever-more removed from practical affairs
as its proximate goal is to develop knowledge for its own sake – not to be developed
within the lived-in environment of ordinary life. This is not its only goal: the products of
science  are  empowering  when properly  integrated  into  the  humanities  and  ongoing
cultural life. Science, when seen as just a phase within the interaction of organisms with
their environments in the process of life, has consequences and applications outside of
itself, in the commonsensical world, with which the humanities are primarily concerned.
The neuropragmatist conception of experience thus seeks to establish and cultivate the
continuities between science and the humanities, between the scientific image and the
manifest images, to improve the richness of living experience in a never-ending process
of growth –just as the neuropragmatist motto implies.4
 
Conclusion
50 Pragmatism started off at a time of significant scientific and technological change. The
industrial and Darwinian revolutions, as well as the American Civil War, brought about
both a sense of crisis and a vision of hope for what humans could do should they work
together toward a common goal. Today we are still wrestling with the consequences of
Darwinism and industrialization. Yet we have further difficulties with which to wrestle
than  the  classical  pragmatists.  For  among  the  consequences  of  Darwinism  and
industrialization is a globalized information society that has the means of yielding both
life-saving, life-improving medical care and the willful creation of biological warfare as
well  as the inadvertent diseases effected by industrial  life and life in an information
society. The successful scientific models that inspired the classical pragmatists were those
of physics, chemistry, and early biology. Neo-Darwinian models of life and the impressive
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rise of the cognitive and behavioral neurosciences5 provide new inspiration, new tools,
new hopes – and new challenges.
51 The consequences of  these new sciences for  our understanding of  ourselves and our
world are not only undeniable and promising; they are also more threatening. Physics
provided  a  cultural  transformation  in  how we  alter  our  environments  and  generate
energy. But it did not seem to threaten our moral, spiritual, and intellectual lives with
any significant conceptual change. Indeed, the changes were seen initially as liberating,
until much more recently. With physics, the moral threats came from increased pollution
of our environment, and, with the Bomb, the very real possibility of mutually assured
destruction.  Chemistry  likewise  gave us  new materials  and fuels  as  well  as  chemical
warfare  and  new  means  of  substance  abuse.  Biology  similarly  brought  benefits  and
dangers,  from longer  life  spans  to  biological  warfare.  But  biology  brought  with  it  a
renewed sense of crisis for the human self-conception. Physics may have displaced the
center of the universe from the Earth, but the belief in Cartesian dualism left the human
soul seemingly intact. Biology, especially after Darwin, opened “the gates of the garden of
life” to experimental methods (Dewey 1910: 7). Now opened, the challenge to pragmatism
is the threat science, especially the neurosciences, poses to our cherished ideals. For the
challenge is not only to bring the products of neuroscientific inquiry to bear on morals
and politics, as so many researches are eager to do today, the challenge is to use such data
in order to bring the experimental method and attitude toward morals and politics as
well.
52 The more we learn about how the most complex product of evolution of which we know –
the human nervous system – the more is at stake. To what ends we use this constantly
growing trove of information is a greater concern than any specific scientific question
itself. Neuropragmatism is the philosophy best suited for guiding humanity through this
new intellectual and moral terrain.
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NOTES
1. We anticipate further advances in not only in the neuroscience of memory but in cultural
evolution to provide further insights into the nature of how it is individual humans remember
within their situated cultures. Our claim here is simply that the information provided by memory
(however memory works) works with imagination (which is not a faculty but a dynamical process
that operates across brain, body, and world). See Johnson 1987, 1993, 2007, Shusterman 2008, and
Bywater 2010.
2. Our position does not here depend on which of  the various theories of  cultural  evolution
prevail. We are sympathetic with the approach Philip Kitcher has taken to the evolution of ethics
and culture. In The Ethical Project (2012), he takes up a Darwinian perspective to culture without
necessarily tying the evolutionary success of cultural practices to their genetic or reproductive
success.  See  Kitcher  (2012:  104-10);  Kitcher  2003;  Godfrey-Smith  (2009:  147-64);  and Sterelny
2012.  Kitcher  and  Godfrey-Smith  have  both  claimed  affinities  with  classical  pragmatism,
especially Dewey’s.
3. For  a  more  extensive  discussion  of  the  differences  in  reaching  rapprochement  between
neurophilosophical reconciliation and neuropragmatic reconstruction, particularly with regard
to the neuroscience of freedom, see Solymosi 2011b.
4. Central  to  this  continuity  between  science  and  common  sense  is  Dewey’s  principle  of
continuity. The neuropragmatist motto from Dewey, quoted at the start of this section, is one
expression of this principle. For Dewey’s mature statements on the postulate of continuity, see
Dewey 1938/LW12: 26 and 30-1. See Johnson 2007: 122-3; Popp 2007; and Solymosi 2011a: 352ff.
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5. We  hasten  to  add  the  role  of  computer  and  information  sciences  both  in  advancing  our
understanding of biology and neuroscience and in significantly modifying our everyday lives.
Without  the shared questions  about  the nature of  mentation,  we would never  have had the
insights raised by the Turing Test, nor the application of those insights to biological phenomena.
Furthermore,  the  further  application  of  computer  and information  sciences  to  everyday  life
have, unfortunately, brought about a rise in disease that comes with a more sedentary lifestyle
made possible by greater ease of communication.
ABSTRACTS
Over the past three decades, cognitive science has been making a turn towards pragmatism. Here
we  outline  steps  towards  completing  this  turn.  As  a  handful  of  cognitive  scientists  and
philosophers have been arguing more recently, the insights of William James, John Dewey, and
George Herbert Mead are not only being re-discovered, they are also proving rather prescient in
light of growing research. The new field of neuropragmatism aims to take these insights seriously
and further into new directions for both pragmatism and cognitive science. In this manifesto, a
brief history of the relationship between classical pragmatism and the sciences of life and mind is
offered as a background for twelve proposed theses of neuropragmatism. These theses serve as
general guidelines for further philosophical and scientific research. To illustrate the possibilities
and  consequences  of  this  neuropragmatic  framework,  neuropragmatist  views  on  traditional
questions of philosophy of mind, such as the mind-body relationship, are situated among other
leading philosophical perspectives, like enactive, embodied, and embedded theories of cognition
and mentation.  Such views,  however,  when taken from a  neuropragmatist  perspecitve,  have
significant consequences for the philosophical project of reconciliation be- tween what Wilfrid
Sellars called the scientific and manifest images of humanity. The difference in conceptions of
experience  and  subesequently  science  are  crucial  for  understanding  the  difference  between
Sellarsian  neurophilosophy  and  neuropragmatism,  as  well  as  how  to  reach  rapprochement
between the sciences and the humanities.
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